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Abstract
There is a huge literature on the eﬀects of uncertainty on trade
levels. One very strong result of that literature is that uncertainty
should not matter, as long as well developed forward markets exist.
The empirical implications of this result, however, are hard to ﬁnd
in the data. We model terms of trade uncertainty in a small open
economy with uncertainty stemming from abroad and derive the equi-
librium demand for forward contracts. It turns out that risk averse
agents will not buy forwards at an actuarially fair price, thus rendering
both the full-hedge theorem and the separation theorem of the afore-
mentioned literature obsolete. Using real world data for Germany we
calibrate our model. We ﬁnd that in equilibrium risk averse agents
will buy forward cover only for investment reasons. The amount of
forwards purchased is around 20% of equilibrium imports. This is
broadly in accordance with empirical observed ratios.
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11 Introduction
International trade in goods is characterized by uncertainty. Common sense
and economic theory suggest that exporters, importers and households should
try to hedge against this uncertainty. Natural candidates for hedging instru-
ments are future and forward contracts. In fact, Ethier (1973) introduced
the separation theorem and the full hedge theorem under exchange rate un-
certainty, showing that demand for forward contracts perfectly compensates
uncertainty. Benninga, Eldor and Zilcha (1985) and Kawai and Zilcha (1986)
additionally discussed price level uncertainty, obtaining the same results. Re-
cently this strong result has been subject to some qualiﬁcations. Viaene and
Zilcha (1998) for example, consider additionally output and cost uncertainty
and ﬁnd that under this setup full-double hedge and separation fail to hold.
Adam-Müller (2000) introduces inﬂation risk which cannot be hedged away
and ﬁnds that full-hedge and separation break down if the two sources of risk
in the model are not statistically independent. Market structure issues have
been addressed as well, examples are Eldor and Zilcha (1987) and Broll and
Zilcha (1992).
The empirical literature, though spares, does not support the strong the-
oretical predictions of the early literature. As Carse, Williamson and Wood
(1980) and others have shown, only roughly one-third of the value of inter-
national trade is covered by forward contracts. Even equity ﬂows are only
poorly hedged. According to Hau and Rey (2003) only 8% of US equity
holdings abroad are hedged against exchange rate risks. Furthermore, there
exists a lively debate in the empirical literature as to whether exchange rate
volatility depresses trade levels or not. This debate is related to the issue
o fd e m a n df o rf o r w a r d si nt h a to f t e nt h ea r g u m e n ti sm a d et h a ta sl o n ga s
agents have access to well developed forward markets, the uncertainty should
not matter. Strikingly, the evidence is rather mixed and seems to be inde-
pendent of the existence of well developed forward markets (see Coté (1994)
for a survey on the empirical evidence and Wei (1998) for a discussion of the
underlying causes).
This paper reconciles empirical ﬁndings with theoretical considerations.
We build an inﬁnite horizon small open economy model where one good
is domestically produced with capital and labour, another good is imported.
Both goods are consumed. Capital is accumulated and risk averse households
hedge optimally against terms of trade uncertainty.1 One forward contract
1In contrast to the majority of the literature on that topic households demand forwards,
not ﬁr m s .T h i s ,h o w e v e r ,s i m p l yf o l l o w sf r o mt h e general equlibrium setup we use. Firms
are owned by the households, who look ”through” them. A similar argument is made in
Bacchetta and Wincoop (1998, pp. 18).
2allows (and obliges) them to buy one import good in the next period at a
ﬁxed price ¯ pY.
We ﬁrst study the determinants of demand for forwards. We show that the
exogenous internationally given forward price ¯ pY is the crucial determinant
of demand for forwards. If this price equals the expected price of the import
good, households do not want to buy any forwards. (They would actually
want to sell forwards.) If this price equals the price at which risk neutral
households would be indiﬀerent, risk averse households demand a positive
amount of forward contract.
The reason for the fact that risk averse households want to sell forwards
at actuarially fair prices lies in the concavity of their utility function in con-
sumption levels. With consumption levels optimally chosen ex-post, indirect
utility functions of individuals exhibit convexity in prices, though still con-
cavity in expenditure. As expenditure is a function of prices as well, overall
the indirect utility function exhibits convexity in prices and households are
actually (price-) risk lovers. Positive demand therefore requires a price that is
suﬃciently low, e.g. the price oﬀered by risk neutral households. Intuitively
we could think of the risk averse households as not willing to commit them-
selves to a consumption decision, when faced with price uncertainty. They
do not want to give away the option to adjust their consumption bundles.
We then calibrate the model by using realistic and reasonable parameter
values. We ﬁnd that between 10 and 20% of international trade is covered
by forward contracts. The low ratios cited in the empirical literature are
therefore not surprising and may reﬂect the curvature of utility functions of
utility maximizing households. Partial equilibrium setups or setups focusing
on risk neutral ﬁrms should therefore be extended to take this aspect into
consideration.
We are not the ﬁrst that ﬁnd that full-hedge theorem and separation
theorem does not hold. As argued above there is a substantial literature
that ﬁnds that these two theorems will not hold as soon as certain conditions,
i.e. independence of the underlying sources of uncertainty, are violated. Our
result, however, is derived in a completely diﬀerent manner. The crucial point
is the decision structure of our agents. The standard approach assumes that
all decisions are made before the resolution of uncertainty. In contrast we
employ an alternative decision rule. In the ﬁrst period, still before resolution
of uncertainty, the agents decide upon their level of hedging and in the second,
after the uncertainty is resolved, the agents actually make their consumption
decision. Following this approach, agents will never be able to eliminate
uncertainty from their budgets and hence are faced with a trade-oﬀ.U s i n g
this setup and considering normal conditions, i.e. actuarially fair insurance,
risk averse agents will never buy forward cover.
3The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, section
3 presents the solutions of the model and the following section discusses the
properties of the equilibrium and makes some qualitative statements of the
comparative static behavior of the system using a numerical calibration of
the model. A brief discourse to options as a mean of comparison ends the
theoretical discussion of the model. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 Technologies
We study a small open economy that produces one good X that is inter-
nationally traded. It imports a foreign consumption good Y which is not
domestically produced. Domestic production requires capital K and labour
L, which are non-tradable,
Xt = X (Kt,L t). (1)
Time is discrete and variables are indexed by t. The production function
X (.) has the standard neoclassical properties. Firms produce under perfect
competition and factor rewards wL
t and wK
t for labour and capital are given










T h en u m b e ro fu n i t so ft h ei m p o r tg o o dt ob ee x c h a n g e df o ro n eu n i to ft h e
export good, i.e. international terms of trade pX
t /pY
t at a point in time t are









t is common knowledge. In what follows, we







One can therefore think of the price of the domestic good as a deterministic
price and of the price of the foreign good as stochastic.
Domestic output X from the production process (1) is used for domestic
consumption CX
t ,e x p o r t sXE





t + It. (3)
Capital grows according to
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + It (4)
4where δ captures depreciation.
In addition to producing the good Y, foreign agents oﬀer forward con-
tracts.2 At a cost of χ p e ru n i tt ob ep a i di nt, foreign agents agree in t to
sell in t+1o n eu n i to ft h ef o r e i g ng o o da tt h ep r i c epY.T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
ﬁxing in t next periods terms of trade at pX/pY. When forward contracts of
total volume Dt are signed, foreign agents agree to sell Dt units of good Y at
¯ pY in t+1. Domestic buyers commit to buy in t+1at this price, irrespective
of the realization of pY
t+1.3
2.2 Households
The horizon of the economy is inﬁnite. Agents in this economy live for two
periods. They work in the ﬁrst period and consume in the second period of
their life. Consumption in the second period comprises both the domestically
produced good and the foreign good.
2.2.1 Preferences and budget constraints
Let their utility function be given by
v = v(u(CX,C Y)),
where u(CX,C Y) is some homothetic utility function and v(.) determines










,σ > 0. (6)
Note that the utility function (5) displays risk aversion towards the con-
sumption levels. Risk aversion in total consumption expenditure is given for
0 <σ<1, risk neutrality in consumption expenditure would be represented
by σ =1 .
A household’s ﬁrst period budget constraint equates labor income with
savings and expenditure for ﬁnancial contracts Dt,
wt = st + χDt. (7)
2Some parts of the literature use the terminology forwards if the contract relates to
foreign exchange and futures if the contract relates to a commodity (see Kawai and Zilcha
(1986) for example). Since in our model there is no trade with this asset between purchase
and maturity, we call them forwards even though it relates to a commodity.
3If, in contrast, Dt represented options, domestic agents would not be obliged to buy
and thus only draw on the contract in favourable situations.
5Savings are used to buy capital goods st/pX. There is the implicit assumption
of a market in which today’s old, being the owners of the capital stock sell it
to today’s young in exchange for consumption good X, which in turn consti-
tutes the wage of today’s young. The sum over all individual savings equal
the current capital stock (i.e. after depreciation) plus additional aggregate
investment (which might be negative)
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + It =
st
pXL. (8)
In the second period, households use all of their wealth and other income
for ﬁnancing consumption expenditure et+1. End of second period wealth
amounts to pX (1 − δ) st




pX. Income from forward contracts is
¡
pY













t+1 − ¯ p
Y¢
Dt, (9)





and savings st were replaced by using the ﬁrst period budget constraint (7).
The second period budget constraint (9) nicely shows that payoﬀs ¡
pY
t+1 − ¯ pY¢
Dt from forward contracts are positive and therefore a second
period source of income when the price pY
t+1 of good Y is suﬃciently high
relative to its price ¯ pY speciﬁed one period before. Forward contracts imply
a loss in the case of low price of good Y. Of course, bad terms of trade shocks
l e a d i n gt oi n c o m ea n dg o o dt e r m so ft r a d es h o c k sl e a d i n gt ol o s s e sf r o m
forward contracts are the reason why forwards exist: they insure against
terms of trade shocks.
This budget constraint also shows that households cannot insure fully
against terms of trade risk. Forward contracts refer to a certain amount of
goods that can be purchased at this ﬁxed price ¯ pY. As the actual amount
of goods consumed depends on the realization pY
t+1 of the price, some uncer-
tainty always remains. This is the crucial departure of our model from the
classic setups in the hedging literature Ethier (1973, pp. 496) and Benninga
et al. (1985, pp. 540). There, ﬁrms decide today in t how much they will
produce tomorrow in t +1 . This allows them to fully insure against uncer-
tainty in the price of their output good. The well-known separation theorem
of no uncertainty after hedging results. If our agents knew how much they
will consume tomorrow, full hedging would be possible as well. They will
never know, however, as price uncertainty has an income eﬀect as well.
62.2.2 A no-bankruptcy constraint
In order to avoid insolvency on parts of the agents in our model, we have to
introduce a no-bankruptcy constraint. Point of departure is the expenditure
equation (9). It goes without saying that a negative expenditure is not
possible, hence we argue that the worst that can happen to the budget of
our agents is:




t+1 − (1 + rt+1)χ − ¯ p
Y¢
Dt =0
Solving for Dt yields
Dt =
(1 + rt+1)wt
(1 + rt+1)χ +¯ pY − pY
t+1
.
Regarding our forward, the worst that can happen is pY
t+1 =0 . Prudence
thus demands that the amount of Dt an agent is allowed to purchase shall
never be any greater than:
Dt ≤
(1 + rt+1)wt
(1 + rt+1)χ +¯ pY (11)
This condition makes intuitively sense: the greater the contracted pY,t h e
smaller the amount of forwards the agents are allowed to buy. Similar lines
of reasoning hold for the other variables.
3S o l v i n g t h e m o d e l
3.1 The maximization problem of households
The maximization problem of households consists in choosing the amount Dt
of forward contracts and optimal consumption levels CX and CY such that
expected utility Ev(u(CX,C Y)) is maximized, given the budget constraint
(9).
Conceptually, maximization can be subdivided into two steps. The second
step consists in allocating consumption expenditure to goods X and Y,taking
consumption expenditure as given. This second sub-problem is solved after
realization of terms of trade. It is therefore a choice under certainty. The














These equations hold at each point in time and determine consumption levels
after uncertainty has been resolved.























is utility where consumption levels in the homo-
thetic utility function u(CX,C Y) have been replaced by optimal consumption
levels. Utility u(CX,C Y) can then be written as expenditure divided by the













where Φ is a constant. Expenditure is given by (9).
This two-step solution to our maximization problem is made possible
by assuming that consumption takes place only when agents are old. If
consumption were to take place in both periods, the consumption choice in
the ﬁrst period would be linked to the saving decision. The system that
w o u l dh a v et ob ea n a l y z e dw o u l db em o r ec o m p l i c a t e d( a sa ni n t e r t e m p o r a l
consumption rule would have to be added).
























This ﬁrst order condition consists, logically, of two parts. The ﬁrst is mar-
ginal utility, here expressed in the form of the indirect utility function. Mar-
ginal utility is positive but decreasing in consumption levels, or as stated
here, increasing in expenditure and decreasing in prices. The second term
in the bracket represents the return from the forwards, which will always be





= pY,s i n c et h et e r m
(1 + rt+1)χ representing the opportunity costs of entering the forward mar-
ket enters negatively. If forwards could be obtained without costs, clearly
these opportunity costs would vanish and actuarially fair forwards would
have an expected return of zero. Once the meaning of the two components
of (15) is clear, the intuition of this ﬁrst order condition is more easy to see.
The sum that constitutes the expected value has a negative and a positive
8component. Marginal utility is, as long as pY
t+1 < (1 + rt+1)χ +¯ pY-t h e
"loss" region - multiplied by a negative number and hence in this interval
contributes negatively. Concavity of the utility function with respect to the
amount of forwards implies that as long as (15) is negative, the agents have
too many forwards and hence should decrease holdings. On the other hand,
as soon as pY
t+1 > (1 + rt+1)χ− ¯ pY - the "win region" - marginal utility con-
tributes positively. Again, concavity tells us, as long as (15) is positive agents
should increase holdings of Dt. However, given positive costs to obtain for-
ward cover, i.e. χ>0,i n c r e a s i n gDt will increase rt, hence opportunity costs
will rise as well, up to a point where marginal utility will fall in Dt.Hence the
optimal amount of Dt is such that the positive and the negative components
of the sum simply cancel out.
3.2 Reduced form
The reduced form of the model consists of two equations. The capital stock in
the next period is given by savings today times the number L of individuals
and divided by the price of one unit of capital and is given by (8). With the
ﬁrst-period budget constraint (7) giving individual savings, we obtain
Kt+1 =
pX
t ∂Xt/∂L − χDt
pX L, (16)
where the wage rate was replaced by its value marginal product (2).
The amount of forward contracts is determined by the ﬁrst order condition
(15). When consuming, the old consume the current capital stock, interest
payments on the current capital stock plus income (or losses) from forward






t+1 − (1 + rt+1)χ − ¯ p
Y¢
Dt (17)
which formally follows from the budget constraint (9) where nominal wages
wt were replaced according to (2).
Equations (15) and (16),g i v e n(17),d e t e r m i n et h et w ov a r i a b l e sKt and
Dt, given an initial capital stock K0.
Equation (16) determining the evolution of capital shows that next pe-
riods capital is known in t. By contrast, expenditure (17) is uncertain when
some forward contracts are signed. This makes consumption levels of both
goods and exports and imports uncertain. If no forward contracts are signed
(D =0 ), expenditure is deterministic, consumption of good X would be
deterministic but consumption of good Y would be stochastic.
93.3 Steady-state
In the steady state, the capital stock is the same in each period. Variables
that are constant are printed without a time subscript. All stochastic vari-




and is therefore a deterministic variable. Domestic production (1) is then
deterministic as well, X = F (K,L). Expenditure (17)




Y − (1 + r)χ − ¯ p
Y¢
D (19)







P (pX, ˜ pY)
¶
˜ pY − (1 + r)χ − ¯ pY





The two reduced form equations yield an unique equilibrium, if they cross
once in R++.E q u a t i o n(16) describing the evolvement of the capital stock is
an o n - l i n e a rﬁrst order diﬀerence equation. Even though it is not possible to
derive an analytical solution, the properties of this type of schedule are well
understood4.T h e o p t i m a l a m o u n t o f D to be purchased is given by (15).
In principle this equation can be understood as an integral. Nevertheless
it is not possible to analytically derive the shape of this schedule, for the
sign of the derivative dEv
dK remains ambiguous. It is, however, possible to
analytically determine whether or not the agents are willing to hold forwards
and hence we turn to this issue ﬁrst. To determine the equilibrium points we
have to resort to numerical methods. This will constitute the second part of
our equilibrium discussion. In the last section we introduce and discuss an
option contract. By deriving several equilibrium properties of this type of
contract the properties of the forwards become more clear also.
4See any basic mathematics for economists textbook on that issue, a good example
being Chiang (1984).
104.1 The equilibrium demand for forwards
We now present three important results with respect to the existence of
interior solutions, i.e. a positive demand for Dt.
Theorem 1 Risk averse agents will not buy forward cover at fair prices, i.e.
E (pY)=pY.5
This result is illustrated in the following ﬁgure:







Figure 1: An example for a global concave function in D
We see here an example for a global concave function in a variable D.E v e n
though the picture above does not represent our utility function, expected
utility is also a global concave function in D6 and hence we can use this
property here. Since our function is globally concave in D the sign of the ﬁrst
derivative of this function with respect to D at the point D =0determines
whether or not there is an interior solution.
In the light of the existing literature on the topic this result is rather
surprising. The standard result is7, that if an unbiased forward market exists,
the agents use this market to avoid all uncertainty, i.e. obtain full cover of
their position. The crucial diﬀerence of our model to the literature lies in the
timing structure. The main body8 o ft h el i t e r a t u r ea s s u m e st h a ta l ld e c i s i o n s
are made before uncertainty is resolved. In contrast, we assume that although
the agents decide on the optimal amount of forward cover before uncertainty
is resolved, their consumption decision is made after the resolution of the
uncertainty. Under this setup buying forward contracts amounts to no less
than restricting ones possibilities to adjust to price realizations. Risk averse
5See appendix 6.1 for the proof.
6The formal argument is presented in the Appendix 6.2.
7See, inter alia, Ethier (1973) Benninga et al. (1985) Kawai and Zilcha (1986) Eldor
and Zilcha (1987) Viaene and de Vries (1992) Zilcha and Broll (1992) Viaene and Zilcha
(1998) and Adam-Müller (2000).
8There are a few papers that discuss the theoretical possibility of a diﬀerent timing
structure, an example being Perée and Steinherr (1989). We are, however, not aware of
a n yw o r kt h a te x p l i c i t e l ym o d e l st h i s .
11a g e n t sw i l ln o tg i v ea w a yt h i so p p o r t u n i t y . I ti sc l e a r ,t h a tt h e r ea r es o m e
decisions that will be made in advance and for this part the analysis of the
existing literature would be appropriate. We believe, however, that most of
consumption decisions are made when actual consumption takes place and
prices are clear.
Theorem 2 Risk averse agents will only buy forward cover for suﬃciently
low pY, i.e. E (pY) > pY.9
Note that this result follows from the ﬁrst theorem, in which we relied
on the negativity of the covariance term. Further this condition is implied
by utility maximization of the agents. One possible interpretation would be
that if pY is lower than the expected value of the price uncertainty in period
two, the average return of a forward position is positive. Thus the agent will
be compensated for giving up their possibility to adjust their consumption
bundle according to the price realizations in the next period. Hence the
agents are willing to hold a forward position. .




Y ), i.e. the price risk neutral households would
oﬀer, risk averse agents will buy forward contracts.10
To illustrate the third result we resort again to the ﬁgure above. Clearly,
since the exponent c = σ(1 − α) is smaller for risk averse agents than for risk
neutral ones and the derivative
dξ
dc is negative, a decrease in c -t h u sm o v i n g
from risk neutrality to risk aversion - increases the slope of the function at
the intersection with the vertical axis. As we are moving from a point where
this slope is zero, we in eﬀect move the whole function to the right.
Note that these results may be somewhat surprising, given the ”full-
hedge theorem” we normally encounter in the literature (see Ethier (1973)
and Kawai and Zilcha (1986) for example). The reason for this is that our
model diﬀers from the usual models in the way that agents always will have
uncertainty through the price-index channel, whereas in the former models
there is the possibility to avoid all uncertainty, for agents completely decide
upon their plans in period one.11 Risk averse agents do not want to lose
the ability to adjust to price shocks in the next period, whereas risk neutral
9See appendix 6.1 for the proof.
10See appendix 6.1 for the proof.
11There is one notable exeption. Clark (1973, Section II, pp.308) deals with the case
where exporters cannot fully hedge away the exchange rate risk, even though there are
perfect forward markets. His reason, however, is a diﬀerent one, for he considers the eﬀects
of limited maturities in that markets.
12agents are indiﬀerent towards this opportunity. This is the reason why risk
neutral households would be willing to oﬀer forward contracts.
The convexity of the indirect utility function with respect to the prices is
illustrated in the ﬁgure below.







Figure 2: An example for the convexity of the indirect utility function using
log-normal distributed price uncertainty
Secondly, we have another factor at work here. By buying forward con-
tracts the agents trade one risk against the other. Holding a forward posi-
tion means that risk now enters directly nominal income. This can be easily
seen from (9). Risk aversion regarding nominal income and the uncertainty
through the price-index channel are the reasons for the agents asking for
more than actuarially fair forwards.
Another interesting point here is the behavior of the risk neutral agents.
By oﬀering forwards at a more than actuarially fair rate, they, on average,
incur losses with this asset. Their compensation, on the other hand, is the
augmented capital stock and its returns.
4.2 Calibrating the model
In this section we will brieﬂy present some numerical solutions of the model.
F u r t h e rt h i ss e c t i o ng i v e ss o m ei n s i g h t si n t ot h ec o m p a r a t i v es t a t i cb e h a v i o r
of our model. We begin with discussing the chosen values. Solving the model
numerically involves computing values of both D and K which satisfy (16)
and simultaneously (15). To get numerical results we need to specify a couple
of parameters and the underlying distribution. As far as possible this has
13been achieved by drawing on real world data.

















Table 1: Parameter values used for calibrating the model





Equation (16) relies on three exogenously given parameters. These are L, χ
and β. PX is the numeraire and thus can be set one. Depreciation is assumed
to be zero, hence we have δ =0and the scale parameter for the technology,
S, is set to one. Now χ represents in some way the costs of the forward
cover, even though, strictly speaking, χ i st h em a r k e tp r i c eo ft h ef o r w a r d
contract. This two concepts are in fact quite diﬀerent. In reality the market
price of the forward cover is quite small, whereas the real costs of obtaining
forward cover may very well be substantial.12 This leaves some room for
determining the value of χ and thus we will set this value arbitrarily, but
close to zero. In our calibration we used 1
100. The size of the population is
just a scale parameter and therefore no further elaboration is necessary. We
set L =1 0 0 . The beta parameter of our production function reﬂects relative
shares of capital (and, by our speciﬁcation also labour) and is commonly
found e.g.Maddison (1987, p. 658) and thus in this context assumed to be
around 0.3.
The other reduced form equation comes with three parameters to specify
as well. These are pY, α and the underlying distribution. The pY is deter-

















Equation (21) is determined by using the ﬁrst order condition (20), setting
σ =1and solving for pY. The parameter of the utility function, α,d e t e r m i n e s
in what ratio domestic and foreign products are consumed. Using data from
12Think of a ﬁrm which has to hire expertise to contract such cover and thus may have
substantial costs. In terms of transfers, like the χDs are, think of margin requirements.
14Statisches Bundesamt, we obtained the empirically observed share foreign
products had in aggregate German consumption. This led us come to an
estimate for α of approximately 0.80. To determine the most appropriate
distribution, we obtained monthly price index data for both import prices
and export prices over the period January 1962 until January 2002, leaving us
with 482 observations. Calculating
index import
index export amounts in terms of our model
to get the price series pY
t . The shape of the histogram suggested choosing a
lognormal distribution, which is an assumption commonly made, for example
in the ﬁnance literature.13 The parameters of the distribution were obtained
by maximum likelihood estimation.14 The estimates were
Distribution E (pY) E (pY)
2
lognormal 0.1149 0.0071
underlying normal 1.12611 0.0103
Table 2: The parameters of the lognormal distribution and the related nor-
mal.
This completes the discussion of the parameters. For computational pur-
poses we made use of Mathematica 4.1.15
4.3 A numerical solution
We now present a simulation result for a small country. Under lognormal
distributed price uncertainty, using the parameter speciﬁcation we presented
above, we found that the economy will buy a total amount of 2.03 units of
forward contracts, given the price risk neutral agents would oﬀer. The capital
stock and thus GDP of the economy can be calculated and using the mean on
the distribution as the realization of the price in period two, the economy will
import 10.2 units of good Y . This means, that the forward cover to import
ratio is in this case approximately 20%. This is in accordance to surveys on
the topic. For example Carse et al. (1980) found that ﬁrms that import or
export and thus face terms of trade risk, only cover between 15-30% of their
open positions.
Some caveats are in order here. First, the actual terms of trade variance
may well be underestimated with our proxy used. If this is true, the calcu-
lated amount of forwards is too high as well. Second, the costs of forwards
13The Black-Scholes formula relies on lognormality of prices. Even in international
macro this assumption is often used, see for example Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998).
14For this purpose we made use of R and the function ﬁt d i s t rw h i c hi si c l u d e di nt h e
MASS package.
15The programme code is available from the authors upon request.
15we used are to some degree arbitrary. They are, however, close to the actual
transaction fees charged by banks but would not incorporate such items as
information costs and ﬁxed costs for setting up the appropriate institutions,
letting alone deliberation costs. To the extent to which the actual costs are
higher, our result overestimates the amount of forwards purchased. Lastly
there is the issue of the degree if risk aversion with respect to wealth. In
the literature there is no consensus on that parameter. We choose to set this
parameter, 1 − σ in our model, to 1
2, which is a conservative choice in the
sense that a broad range of publications support this choice. It also turns out
that this particular parameter is the least inﬂuential in altering our results.
The aformentioned qualiﬁctations notwithstanding, this numerical exercise
recaps our analytical results and shows that the model is able to ﬁtt h ea c t u a l
data for reasonable parameter values.
4.4 Comparative statics
There are a couple of interesting questions arising when considering changing
the parameters. We begin with the terms of trade variance. If there is an
exogenously induced increase in the variance of the foreign price we observe
a fall in the demand for forwards. At our calculated equilibrium point we
observe a decrease of 4.7% in demand for forwards if we increase the variance
by 1%. This is accordance with the intuition for our results. Risk averse
agents are not willing to give up the possibility to adjust themselves to a
terms of trade shock. The greater the likelihood of a terms of trade shock,
the more they have to be compensated for holding forward contracts.
Next consider the costs of the forwards. If costs decrease, demand will
increase. At the point of our interior solution a 1% decrease in the costs
would induce a 16% rise in the demand for forward contracts.
Lastly we look at the degree of risk aversion. A society which is more
risk averse than another will demand less forward cover than the less risk
averse society. A 1% increase of the degree of risk aversion, i.e. a 1% fall in
σ, reduces demand for forwards by 0.4%. The comparative static result for
an increase in the variance is covered in the picture below:








Figure 3: An increase in the terms of trade variance decreases demand for
forwards
An increase in the variance of pY, an increase in the costs χ and an increase
in the degree of risk aversion will ceteris paribus decrease the demand for
forward cover by shifting the schedule implied by (15) downwards. Note that
in the case of changing costs, the capital schedule will also shift.
4.5 Options
In order to give additional insights into the workings of our model, we will
in this section examine what the optimal hedging behavior would be if the
agents could buy options instead of forward contracts to insure against the
uncertainty regarding the price of the foreign good. An (call) option, as
opposed to a forward contract, does not oblige to buy the underlying asset
(or commodity), instead the buyer can choose whether or not he will exercise
his option. If we are to keep our notation we can extend our model very






the buyer of that option would simply not exercise it. To model options we
only have to change the expenditure equation:














Where Dt now denotes now the amount of options instead of forward con-
tracts, the strike price being pY. Hence by buying one option for the price
χ an agent is entitled to buy one unit of good Y in the next period for the












































Theorem 4 If options are costless, i.e. χ =0 ,t h eo p t i m a la m o u n to fDt =
∞.
This is probably the most straightforward result. Of course rational
agents, being oﬀered a free lunch, will happily accept this. Here the free
lunch comes as a free lottery ticket, without any risk of loosing. We present
this otherwise not very surprising result to make the structure of the decision
problem more clear.
Theorem 5 If agents can choose between options and forwards at the same
costs they will always choose options.
To facilitate the comparison between forwards and options we present
the second result. It constitutes, again, a standard property of the utility
function of the agents. Forwards will always be dominated by options, as
long as the price is the same for both.
Corollary 6 For options and forward contracts to exist jointly forwards ei-
ther have to cost less or be more than actuarially fair (or both).
To have in our world what we observe in reality, the joint existence of
options together with forwards, necessitates the latter being cheaper than
the former, a result that directly follows from above two theorems.





= pY, agents will
demand a positive amount of options, for a given positive cost of doing so χ.
Our last results highlights again the diﬀerence between forwards and op-
tions. In contrast to forward contracts there exist a positive demand, de-
pending on the price χ, of "actuarially fair options", that is options that
have a strike price that equals the expected value of the price in the next
period.
16The proofs can be found in the appendix 4.1.
185C o n c l u s i o n
One largely debated issue in international economics is the question whether
or not volatility in exchange rates and terms of trade depresses trade levels.
There is an extensive literature on that question, both theoretical and empir-
ical. The main body of the theoretical literature claims that terms of trade
and/or exchange rate uncertainty does not matter as long as well developed
forward/futures markets exist. This literature further predicts that agents
fully hedge the existing risks. The empirical work done in this ﬁeld fails to
unambiguously support these ﬁndings.
We model a small open economy that is subject to terms of trade risk
completely stemming from abroad. We show that under this setup there is
no demand for terms of trade insurance, a direct eﬀect of the convexity of
the indirect utility index with respect to prices. Risk aversion with respect
to consumption levels and expenditure levels is not suﬃcient a motive to
buy forwards. Further we derive the condition under which, on part of the
risk averters, a positive demand for forwards will exist. In any world where
diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion up to risk neutrality jointly exists, there
will be a positive demand for the kind of forwards which we modeled, for the
agents with diﬀering attitude towards risk would oﬀer a more than actuari-
ally fair insurance so that most risk averse agents would be willing to enter
this contracts. The motive for the demand, however, will not be hedging but
pure investment. We calibrate our model with data for Germany to obtain
numerical solutions. The equilibrium amount of forwards contracted in re-
lation to the equilibrium amount of imports closely resembles the empirical
observed values, thus providing a rationale for the apparent underhedging
of domestic agents against price level and/or exchange rate uncertainty. We
then showed that options, as opposed to forwards, will be demanded as means
of insurance. If prices are equal, options strictly dominate forward contracts.
This straightforward result may help explain why the market for options has
grown exponentially over the last decade or so.
The main contribution of our analysis, however, is that the ”price-convexity”
eﬀect should be incorporated in the existing models, which could be achieved
by giving up the assumption that all plans are irrevocably made in the pe-
riod which precedes the resolution of the uncertainty. This should alter
dramatically the strong theoretical predictions of this literature with respect
to forward markets and should thus provide a better understanding of the
eﬀects at work here. Since forwards are unattractive and options perhaps too
expensive, our analysis may also provide an additional argument in favour
of international capital ﬂows, and hence capital account liberalization, as a
means of insuring the economy.
19Our work can be extended in some promising ways. First, to understand
the implications of covariance eﬀects so often at work in the hedging process
money and thus a nominal exchange rate should be brought into the model.
This would also allow a comparison between our modeling approach and the
existing literature that has proceeded with considering multiple sources of
risk. Another interesting extension would be the to allow for heterogenous
agents explicitly. In doing that we could render endogenous the oﬀered for-
ward price pY.
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6A p p e n d i x
6.1 Derivation of the Theorems
This appendix provides the proofs of all results we presented in section 4.1.
Theorem 1: Risk averse agents will not buy forward cover at fair
prices, i.e. E (pY)=pY.
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider the ﬁrst-condition17 (15) and assume
away any costs of forward cover, i.e. χ =0 . Further we are looking at the
17For this proof we supressed time indices to ease notational burden. Since we are
looking at steady-state values, time indices contain no additional information, in the case
of the price uncertainty we always take expectations in t of next periods pY .



























































Two results emerge. First, since Cov[p
−c










Together with the result19
d2EU
dD2 < 0
we know that there cannot be an interior solution with D>0.
Theorem 2: Risk averse agents will only buy forward cover for suf-
ﬁciently low pY,i . e .E (pY) > pY.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 . For any interior solution we need the ﬁrst order

























Y ) = pY <E(pY) which is our second
result.





Y ), i.e. the price risk neutral households
would oﬀer, risk averse agents will buy forward contracts.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . The ﬁnal result may be approached in a slightly
diﬀerent manner. Deﬁne a function ξ (c) which gives the sign of (23) at point















18This follows from the fact that in our case we have f0 (pY ) ∗ g0 (pY ) ≤ 0 ∀p where
f (pY )=pY and g(pY )=p
−c







≤ 0. See also Hardy, Littlewood and Polya (1952, pp. 43 and
p.168) for reference.
19See Appendix (6.2)















Consider now risk neutral households. Their optimization problem will, in












as the price for which there is an interior solution.
















































For values of 0 <c<1 clearly the derivative is negative, for both terms




Y ) risk averse
agents will buy forward contracts, since, by deﬁnition of risk aversion and
risk neutrality we have cA <c N =1− α.
Theorem 4: If options are costless, i.e. χ =0 , the optimal amount
of Dt = ∞.













regardless of the choice of D. Since utility is increasing in consumption and
consumption is increasing in Dt it is optimal to demand an inﬁnite amount.
Theorem 5: If agents can choose between options and forwards at the
same cost they will always choose options.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 . We prove this by contradiction. First note that
for an interior solution to the optimal choice of Dt we need to have the ﬁrst













































w h i c hc a n n o tb et r u ef o rt h es a m es e to fp a r a m e t e r s . T h i se s t a b l i s h e s
that the two ﬁrst order conditions cannot hold simultaneously. Moreover the


















































































































This together with concavity of utility in Dt this is enough to establish the
result.





= pY,a g e n t s
will demand a positive amount of options, for a given positive cost of doing
so χ.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m7 . The proof follows directly from (22). The ﬁrst
integral enters negatively, the second positively. In general, there is a χ small
enough to render the overall sum zero.
6.2 Concavity of expected utility with respect to D
In this section we give a short proof of the concavity of the indirect expected
utility function with respect to the forwards.
24Our ﬁrst order condition, i.e. the ﬁrst derivative of indirect expected








































and thus an (possibly) inﬁnite sum over negative values, which cannot be
other than negative as well.
6.3 Balance of payment
This appendix checks consistency of the model by validating that the saldo
of the balance of payments equals zero. Formally
EXt − IMt + CFt =0
must hold. Then
p
XXt − αetL − p






Dt−1L − χDtL =0⇔
p







Using (9) for expenditure brings about:
p















X [Xt − It] − (1 + rt)(wt−1 − χDt−1)L − χDtL =0
We complete our proof by replacing Xt and It.Nominal investment in our
model is by (7) and (8) simply ﬁr s tp e r i o di n c o m er e d u c e db yﬁrst period
spending,
p
XIt =( wt − χDt)L − (1 − δ)p
XKt (27)
25The capital stock in the period after saving is given by (4),s p e c i ﬁcally
p
XKt+1 =( 1− δ)p
XKt + p
XIt
Noting further, by the assumption of constant returns to scale, our output




t L + w
K
t Kt (28)
we have everything we need to proceed:
w
L
t L + w
K
t Kt − (wt − χDt)L +( 1− δ)p
XKt
−(1 + rt)(wt−1 − χDt−1)L − χDtL =0⇔
w
K






















w h e r ew em a d eu s eo f(2), (16) and (10).
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